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This paper argues that assortative matching can explain over-education.
Education determines individuals￿income and, due to the presence of as-
sortative matching, the quality of the partner, who can be a colleague or
a spouse. Thus an individual acquires some education to improve the
expected partner￿ s quality. But since everybody does that, the expected
partner￿ s quality does not increases and over-education emerges. Public
intervention can solve over-education through a progressive income tax.
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In recent decades, the level of educational attainment in developed countries
has surpassed the skill requirements of available jobs1. This is known as ￿over-
education￿ . There is a large empirical literature measuring over-education2,
while this paper aims to contribute to a theoretical understanding of it.
We propose an explanation for the existence of over-education based on
the idea that acquiring education has two main e⁄ects. First, it improves job
conditions: income, job quality, and so on. Second, it in￿ uences the quality of
the future colleagues and spouses.
School and university are among the places where people create their own
social networks, make friends and spend a considerable part of their youth.
At school, individuals can meet their future colleagues. For instance, school
or university mates can apply to the same company, decide to work in part-
nership or ￿nd themselves working in the same ￿rm. Also, many people meet
their spouse at school3. Colleagues and spouses who met at school share similar
education levels4. We refer to this positive correlation as ￿assortative match-
ing￿ 5. Assortative matching re￿ ects similarities in innate ability, since this is
similar in individuals who share the same school experience. Our idea is that
the presence of assortative matching may cause over-education.
1Vaisey (2006) shows evidence that a substantial and growing number of American workers
are over-quali￿ed for their jobs along the period 1972-2002. The principal time-trend is
positive and linear, and appears to be the result of the widening gap between a large expansion
in educational attainment and only modest increases in job educational requirements over
the past three decades. Budria and Moro-Egido (2007) ￿nd same evidence in European
countries and a negative di⁄erential in salary between over-quali￿ed individuals and their
well-matched counterparts.
2For discussions, see Hartog, 2000 and McGuinness, 2006.
3Stevens (1991) analysed the reasons of why spouses tend to have similar educational
levels. In the sample considered, more than 50% of spouses attended the same school, college
or university.
4Some evidence of the positive relation in the education of colleagues can be found in
Barth, (2002) and Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003). There is a large empirical evidence on
the positive relationship in spouses￿education. Some important contributions are Kalmijn
(1991a, 1991b), Mare (1991), Pencavel (1998), Quian (1998), Qian and Preston (1993); Smits
et al. (2000), Schwartz and Mare (2005).
5The expression ￿assortative matching￿has been coined by Gary Becker (1973), and it
alludes to a relationship (either positive or negative) between characteristics of spouses. We
refer to the similarities in the levels of education speci￿cally, and we apply the relationship
not only to spouses, but also to colleagues.
2We build up a model where individuals di⁄er in ability. They study and
are matched in the working period with a partner, who can be a colleague or
a spouse. The partner￿ s ability positively a⁄ects the individual￿ s utility. This
may be due to a variety of reasons. An individual can bene￿t from a colleague
by informal apprenticeship, appraising or good in￿ uence, and from a spouse by
sharing interests and income. Individuals maximise their expected utility by
choosing their education levels and taking into account their matching.
This can be random or assortative. Random matching takes place when
partners meet each other by chance. Assortative matching occurs if an indi-
vidual meets the partner at school or university, or in any situation where the
educational level in￿ uences the chance of a meeting. Whether matching is as-
sortative depends on the institutions and tradition of a society: for example,
the more the educational system requires that students spend time together,
the more likely the matching will be assortative.
Our results suggest that assortative matching makes the education acquired
ine¢ cient from a social point of view. In particular, individuals would reach
a lower level of education in a socially optimal solution. Thus we de￿ne over-
education as the di⁄erence between the actual level of education and the socially
optimal level of education.
What determines these results? Assortative matching gives an incentive to
study more in order to increase the partner￿ s quality. However, every individual
with the same level of ability acquires the same quantity of education and
hence is matched with a partner of the same type. This approach is in the
￿ avour of Akerlof (1976), where workers signal their ability through their work
speed. In order to look more able, workers of a given ability work faster than
they would if they were not observed. In our model, individuals observe the
partner￿ s education level as a signal of ability, and in order to look more able
they acquire more education than they would if assortative matching were not
present.
The paper considers next whether public intervention can make individuals
reach the socially e¢ cient level of education by introducing a progressive income
tax. This intervention can correct over-education by imposing a higher ￿scal
burden the higher the individual￿ s income. These results may justify income
progressive taxation on e¢ ciency grounds and not to answer to redistributive
3arguments.
To our knowledge, over-education has not been largely developed from a
theoretical perspective, with few notable exceptions. Frank (1978) investigates
the di⁄erentials in wages between men and women as a consequence of female
over-quali￿cation. This is caused by family location decisions, since a family
is more likely to move close to better jobs for the husband, sacri￿cing the
wife￿ s opportunities. Hence the role di⁄erences between men and women are
essential for his results, and over-education is generated by a job search process.
Compared to this work, we do not consider di⁄erences in wages among sexes,
job search nor the di⁄erent role in society between men and women.
Our results are consistent with Lommerud (1989), where over-education oc-
curs as individuals care about social status, determined by the relative income.
Like in our paper, he corrects over-education through a progressive income tax-
ation. This can weaken the incentive to undertake education, hence subsidies
might be necessary to restore this incentive.
Konrad and Lommerud (2000) explain over-education through a household
bargaining model where young individuals individually choose their level of
education and, once married, they sacri￿ce their returns to education in favour
of an optimal level of family public goods (i.e., to spend time with children,
partner, and so on). Over-education emerges because the educational decisions
a⁄ect the threat point (i.e., the reservation utility given by being single) of
spouses. To over-invest in education is ine¢ cient in order to optimise the
quantity of the family public good, but leads to an increase in the threat point
so as to be in an advantaged position in the household bargaining.
This paper shares with studies by Peters and Siow (2001), Baker and Jacob-
sen (2005), Iyigun and Walsh (2005), Chiappori et al.(2006) and Nosaka (2007)
the link between education and assortative matching. However, in these con-
tributes this link does not explain over-education, and they consider assortative
matching only between spouses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 shows the results. Section 4 illustrates government interven-
tion. Section 5 concludes.
42 The model
There is a continuum of individuals6 normalised to 1. Individuals di⁄er in
ability, denoted by ￿ 2 [￿;￿] and distributed according to density f (￿) with
cumulative distribution function F(￿). We refer to ability as every innate
characteristic that contributes to income potential. Individuals choose their
level of education. We denote as e ￿ 0 the quantity of education acquired by
an individual. Education is costly for individuals. We denote the utility cost
of education as c
2e2, where c > 0.
After deciding their education, individuals work and are matched with a
partner. We denote as e￿ the income of an individual with education e and
ability ￿. The partner can be seen as a colleague or a spouse. An individual
bene￿ts from the partner￿ s quality7. This is represented by ￿￿p, where ￿ 2
[0;1] is the relative importance of the partner￿ s quality in determining the
individual￿ s utility, while ￿p 2 [￿;￿] denote the partner￿ s ability. Thus an
individual￿ s utility is determined by8:





We analyse the matching technology and then the educational problem.
2.1 Matching
Matching can be of two types: random or assortative. A random matching
occurs when partners meet each other by chance. This happens anytime a
meeting takes place in situations that are completely unrelated to the acquired
6We do not consider di⁄erences in sex. This implies that men and women behave sym-
metrically, and excludes the case (more credible in reality) that educational decisions change
according to sex (due to a di⁄erent role in society and household, childbearing and so forth).
However, the message of the paper does not change by considering di⁄erences in sex and
these would only complicate the analysis.
7In teamwork, individuals ￿nd the performance of their duties easier if those they co-
operate with are able, competent and dedicated. In individual jobs, a good environment
improves job performance through suggestions or discussions. In love life, individuals share
the advantages of a more able spouse: a better income, work ￿ exibility (which re￿ ects more
availability in the love life), a more interesting conversation and more open mindedness.
8We assume a linear additive utility in order to keep the analysis tractable. Di⁄erent
formulations would complicate the algebra without adding any insight.
5education. For example, a match between a lawyer and a botanist sharing the
passion for football and playing in the same team is totally casual. Two indi-
viduals meeting at the supermarket can have completely di⁄erent educational
backgrounds.
Assortative matching occurs when an individual meets the partner at school,
university or in any situation where the educational level in￿ uences the chance
of a meeting. For example when individuals attend the same social environment
given by previous school friendships, or when a certain activity is related to the
studies attended, like individuals with a degree in arts meeting in a museum
or in an exhibition, and so on. In all these cases, the partners￿education is
positively related. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that with assortative
matching, a perfect positive correlation exists in partners￿levels of education.
In other words, the partner of an individual who acquires education e has the
same level of education e. Considering an imperfect correlation would not alter
our results.
Let ￿ 2 [0;1] denote the exogenous probability that the matching is as-
sortative. This is independent of the individual￿ s ability ￿. The value of ￿
depends on the customs and the educational system of the society we are con-
sidering. For instance, the more an educational system requires that students
spend years at school for obtaining a certain quali￿cation, the more the proba-
bility of assortative matching9. Another example is the role of school tracking,
that is the separation of pupils by academic ability into groups for all subjects
within a school (Gamoran, 1992). An educational system that postpones school
tracking keeps a more heterogeneous group of pupils together for a long time,
by decreasing the probability of assortative matching10.
9Blossfeld and Timm (2003) analyse the relationship between educational system and
marital assortative matching in many western countries. Their results show that the more
time individuals spend at school, the greater the chance of marrying a partner with similar
education (i.e., the higher ￿).
10Holmlund (2007) studies the relationship the e⁄ects of a school reform on marital assor-
tative matching. She examines an educational reform, implemented in Sweden in the 1950s
and 60s, which postponed tracking and extended compulsory education from seven to nine
years. Her results show that this might have resulted in a reduction in assortative matching.
62.2 Educational choice
When individuals decide the quantity of education to acquire, the future match-
ing a⁄ects their decisions. According to equation (1), they prefer to be matched
with a high-quality partner, as this increases their bene￿t. With random match-
ing, since there is no correlation in partners￿education, individuals have no in-
formation about the partner￿ s characteristics during the educational decisions.




￿pf(￿p)d￿p, and hence random matching does not in￿ uence the
educational choice.
With assortative matching instead, individuals can observe the education of
some of their potential partners (for example, their school friends) during their
educational period. Thus they may want to acquire more education in order to
improve the probability of being matched with a better partner. Consequently,
it is possible to in￿ uence the expected partner￿ s type through the educational
decisions.
In particular, individuals can correctly infer the partner￿ s ability through
their education. This is shown by supposing E (￿p) being the education of a
partner with ability ￿p, and also that11 E0 (￿p) > 0. The fact that in equilib-
rium, education is a strictly increasing function of ability allows the individual
to recognise the partner￿ s ability through her education. From a technical per-
spective, this happens because an increasing function can be inverted12. Given
the assumption that in assortative matching partners have the same level of
education, then an individual with ability ￿ acquiring an amount of education
e will be matched with a partner whose education is e = E (￿p). Hence the
individual can infer the partner￿ s ability ￿p as the inverse image of E (￿p), so
11In practice, we are arguing that the belief in equilibrium is that education is an increasing
and monotonic function of ability. In other words, individuals believe that the abler ones
study more. The equilibrium that emerges is ￿separating￿(i.e., the level of education will be
di⁄erent for each level of ability). This does not exclude the existence of other equilibria that
are determined by di⁄erent beliefs. For instance, if the belief is that the level of education
is constant irrespective of the individuals￿ability, then a pooling equilibrium must emerge.
However, the belief we focus on looks more consistent to what happens in the reality.
12Clearly we need to verify that in equilibrium this condition holds.














In equilibrium we consider, all type e individuals make identical choices,
and so (2) is the expected utility in each individual type e. The ￿rst part of (2)
is the total bene￿t given by the individual￿ s income, the second part is the total
bene￿t given by the partner￿ s quality, and the third part is the total cost of




￿pf(￿p)d￿p, and (ii) ￿￿E￿1(e), which represent the expected bene￿t
given by the partner with random and assortative matching, respectively.
Equation (2) shows that, in the presence of assortative matching, the educa-
tional choice e in￿ uences not only the future income (e￿) but also the partner￿ s
expected quality (￿E￿1(e)). In particular, an individual tries to manipulate
the education signal by acquiring more education than others of similar ability,
in order to obtain, in the future, a partner with higher ability than her. But
in equilibrium, every individual takes into account assortative matching and
tries to do precisely this, hence with probability ￿ everyone is matched with a
partner of same ability.





￿1 (e) ￿ ce = 0: (3)
The following lemma shows the solution of equation (3).













Since an individual with ability ￿ acquires a level of education e and with
assortative matching a partner with ability ￿p = E￿1 (e) acquires an amount of



















2c < 0, and hence this is not a feasible solu-
tion as e > 0.
In order eov to be invertible, it needs to be a strictly increasing function.









In the equilibrium presented in the previous section, a part of the education
acquired by individuals is to improve the quality of the potential partner. But
since everyone does this, the expected quality of partners does not improve.
Thus although individuals choose their optimal amount of education, the overall
education is not socially e¢ cient. Indeed the bit acquired for increasing the
chance of a better potential partner is not helpful in it, and hence is wasted.
In this section we investigate the equilibrium where individuals exploit the
socially optimal educational resources. We assume that education is determined
by a planner aiming to maximise social welfare. This is given by the unweighted















In other words, the social welfare function considered does not take into
account assortative matching, in order to rule out the cause of ine¢ ciency from
the problem. For every ￿, the social planner problem is the maximisation of
equation (2) when ￿ = 0.
13Note that we can substitute E￿1(e) = ￿ only once that e has been maximised. If we
do it before the maximisation is like to keep as ￿xed the partner￿ s education. But this is







Equilibrium with assortative matching
First best equilibrium
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The solution of Lemma 1 becomes e￿ = ￿
c. In order to have over-education,





c, which is always veri￿ed since
4c￿￿￿ > 0: This is intuitive. In the presence of assortative matching, indi-
viduals observe the potential partners￿education and try to look more able.
This extra amount of education is not considered by the social planner. In-
dividuals obtain the same result in terms of optimal choice (i.e., same income
and partner), but employing less educational resources than in the presence
of assortative matching and thus optimising social welfare (Figure 1). Hence
we refer to e￿ as the ￿rst best equilibrium. Over-education is de￿ned as the
di⁄erence between eov and e￿.








2c is the level of over-
education.
The following proposition summarises the comparative statics properties of
￿e.
10Proposition 1 An increase either in assortative matching or in the relative
importance of the partner￿ s quality leads to an increase in over-education. Also,
the higher the ability, the more an individual is over-educated. Finally, as the
cost of education increases, the level of over-education diminishes.
Proof. Di⁄erentiation of ￿e with respect to ￿, ￿, ￿ and c yields ￿￿(￿2 + 4c￿￿￿)
￿ 1
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By looking at ￿e, we can observe that an increase either in ￿ or in the
relative importance of the partner￿ s quality ￿ leads to an increase in over-
education. Clearly, individuals acquire more education the more likely they
meet their partner among their school friends (￿ high). Also, they invest more
in education if ￿ is high, since having a high-quality partner is more valuable.
This leads to more over-education. Moreover, over-education proportionally
increases the higher the individuals ability. Finally, as the cost of education
increases, the level of over-education increases.
4 Government intervention
In this section, we assume that there is a government whose objective is to reach
the ￿rst best education level. To accomplish this, the government considers to
levy a tax. We focus on a ￿rst best solution through a progressive taxation on
income. To do that we need the strong assumption that the government is able
to perfectly discriminate taxation according to individual type. This indeed
implies that the government can observe individuals￿ability, which is clearly
not possible in the reality.
With progressive taxation, the tax rate increases the higher the income. We





2 [0;1], where ￿ represents the tax progression
and e￿L is the lowest income in the population considered (the income of the































￿1 (e) = ce + ￿
2￿; (5)
and the level of education is determined by the following lemma.











ce + ￿2￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
:
By integrating and substituting E￿1 (e) = ￿:
￿ =
(ce + ￿2￿ ￿ ￿)e
￿￿
.













and hence this is not a feasible solution as e > 0.



















￿ < 0, we have a unique feasible
solution.












Figure 2 shows the equilibrium where the progressive income tax is levied.
These results may justify the introduction of income progressive taxation on
e¢ ciency grounds, with no appeal to equity or redistributive reasons.
The following corollary illustrates the relationship between the education
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2 + ce MC with progressive income tax
Corollary 1 The more progressive the taxation on income, the less the incen-
tive to acquire education.














As the tax progression increases, the incentives of acquiring education di-
minish. This result is in line with Lommerud (1989), where progressive income
taxation corrects over-education but blunts the incentive to undertake educa-
tion.
5 Concluding remarks
In the presence of assortative matching, individuals increase their education to
improve the quality of colleagues or spouses. But as everyone is more educated,
the extra education acquired does not improve the chance of a good match.
Hence over-education emerges, since individuals can obtain the same result
in terms of optimal choice but exploiting less educational resources. Public
13intervention can solve over-education through a progressive tax on income.
An interesting extension of the paper may be to consider assortative match-
ing in terms of social class. Although educational and social class assortative
matching are positively correlated, individuals with di⁄erent social background
may acquire the same level of education. Introducing assortative matching by
social class may have di⁄erent e⁄ects according to the social group we regard.
On the one hand, the opportunity cost to acquire more education is generally
higher for advantaged individuals since, for instance, they may have better
job opportunities through the parental network. On the other hand, this can
strengthen the e⁄ect on over-education for disadvantaged people, as assortative
matching by class is a further barrier in the attempt to improve the matching
through education. The introduction of assortative matching by social class is
left for future work.
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